Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. A recent work [Wu, Quantum mechanism helps agents combat "bad" social choice rules. Intl. J. of Quantum Information 9 (2011) 615-623] generalized the implementation theory with complete information to a quantum domain. In this paper, we propose a quantum Bayesian mechanism and an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, which amend the traditional results for Bayesian implementation.
Introduction
Mechanism design is an important branch of economics. Compared with game theory, it concerns a reverse question: given some desirable outcomes, can we design a game that produces them? Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation are two key topics of the mechanism design theory. The former assumes complete information among the agents, whereas the latter concerns incomplete information. Maskin [1] provided an almost complete characterization of social choice rules that are Nash implementable when the number of agents is at least three. Postlewaite and Schmeidler [2] , Palfrey and Srivastava [3] , and Jackson [4] together constructed a framework for Bayesian implementation.
In 2011, Wu [5] claimed that the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum mechanism. Furthermore, this amendment holds in the macro world by virtue of an algorithmic mechanism [6] . Given these accomplishments in the field of Nash implementation, this paper aims to investigate what will happen if the quantum mechanism is applied to Bayesian implementation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls preliminaries of Bayesian implementation given by Serrano [7] . In Section 3, a novel condition, multi-Bayesian monotonicity, is defined. Section 4 and 5 are the main parts of this paper, in which we will propose quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms respectively. The last section draws the conclusions.
Preliminaries
Let N = {1, · · · , n} be a finite set of agents with n ≥ 2, A = {a 1 , · · · , a k } be a finite set of social outcomes. Let T i be the finite set of agent i's types, and the private information possessed by agent i is denoted as t i ∈ T i . We refer to a profile of types t = (t 1 , · · · , t n ) as a state. Consider environments in which the state t = (t 1 , · · · , t n ) is not common knowledge among the n agents. We denote by T the set of states compatible with an environment, i.e., a set of states that is common knowledge among the agents. Let T = i∈N T i . Each agent i ∈ N knows his type t i ∈ T i , but not necessarily the types of the others. We will use the notation t −i to denote (t j ) j i . Similarly,
Each agent has a prior belief, probability distribution, q i defined on T . We make an assumption of nonredundant types: for every i ∈ N and t i ∈ T i , there exists t −i ∈ T −i such that q i (t) > 0. For each i ∈ N and t i ∈ T i , the conditional probability of t −i ∈ T −i , given t i , is the posterior belief of type t i and it is denoted q i (t −i |t i ). For simplicity, we shall consider only single-valued rules, i.e., an SCF f is a mapping f : T → A. Let F denote the set of SCFs. Given agent i's state t i and utility function u i (·, t) : ∆ × T → R, the conditional expected utility of agent i of type t i corresponding to a social choice function (SCF) f : T → ∆ is defined as:
An environment with incomplete information is a list E =< N, A, (u i , T i , q i ) i∈N >. An environment is economic if, as part of the social outcomes, there exists a private good (e.g., money) over which all agents have a strictly positive preference. Two SCFs f and h are equivalent
Denote by B(Γ) the set of Bayesian equilibria of the mechanism Γ. Let g(B(Γ)) be the corresponding set of equilibrium outcomes. An SCF f is Bayesian implementable if there exists a mechanism Γ = ((M i ) i∈N , g) such that g(B(Γ)) ≈ f . An SCF f is incentive compatible if truth-telling is a Bayesian equilibrium of the direct mechanism associated with f , i.e., if for every i ∈ N and for every t i ∈ T i ,
Consider a strategy in a direct mechanism for agent i, i.e., a mapping 
T . An SCF f is Bayesian monotonic if for any deception α, whenever f • α f , there exist i ∈ N, t i ∈ T i , and an SCF y such that
In economic environments, the sufficient and necessary conditions for full Bayesian implementation are incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity. To facilitate the following discussion, here we cite the Bayesian mechanism (Page 404, line 4, [7] ) as follows: Consider a mechanism Γ = ((M i ) i∈N , g), where M i = T i × F × Z + , and Z + is the set of nonnegative integers. Each agent is asked to report his type t i , an SCF f i and a nonnegative integer z i , i.e., m i = (t i , f i , z i ). The outcome function g is as follows:
In all other cases, the total endowment of the economy is awarded to the agent of smallest index among those who announce the largest integer. 
and an SCF y i ∈ F that satisfy:
Let l = |N α |. Without loss of generality, let these l agents be the last l agents among n agents.
In 1993, Matsushima [9] claimed that Bayesian monotonicity is a very weak condition when utility functions are quasi-linear and lotteries are available. Consider an SCF f that satisfies Bayesian monononicity, if there is a deception α such that its corresponding agent i has another symmetric agent j (i.e., i j, u i = u j , T i = T j , the prior belief and posterior belief hold by them are the same), then f is multiBayesian monotonic.
Example 1: Similar to Example 23.B.5 in Ref. [8] , here we consider an auction setting with one seller (i.e., agent 0) and three buyers (i.e., agent 1, 2 and 3). All buyers' privately observed valuations t i are drawn independently from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] and this fact is common knowledge among the agents. Each buyer submits a sealed bid, b i ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2, 3). The sealed bids are examined and the buyer with the highest bid is declared the winner. If there is a tie, the winner is chosen randomly. The winning buyer pays an amount equal to his bid to the seller. The losing buyer does not pay anything.
Consider the social choice function f (t) = (x 0 (t), x 1 (t), x 2 (t), x 3 (t), p 0 (t), p 1 (t), p 2 (t), p 3 (t)), in which x 1 (t) = 1, if t 1 ≥ t 2 and t 1 ≥ t 3 ; = 0 otherwise; x 2 (t) = 1, if t 2 > t 1 and t 2 ≥ t 3 ; = 0 otherwise; x 3 (t) = 1, if t 3 > t 1 and t 3 > t 2 ; = 0 otherwise; x 0 (t) = 0, for all t;
It can be easily checked that the strategies b i (t i ) = t i (for i = 1, 2, 3) constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this auction that indirectly yields the outcomes specified by f (t). Thus, according to Theorem 1 [4] , f is incentive compatible and Bayesian monotonic. Since the three buyers are symmetric, then according to the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity, f is multi-Bayesian monotonic.
Proposition 1:
In economic environments, consider an SCF f that is incentive compatible and Bayesian monotonic, if f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then f • α is not Bayesian implementable by using the traditional Bayesian mechanism, where α is specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity. Proof: According to Serrano's proof (Page 404, line 33, [7] ), all equilibrium strategies fall under rule (i), i.e., f is unanimously announced and all agents announce the integer 0. Consider the deception α specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity. At first sight, if every agent i ∈ N submits (α i (t i ), f, 0), then f • α may be generated as the equilibrium outcome by rule (i). However, For each agent i ∈ N α , he has incentives to unilaterally deviate from (α i (t i ), f, 0) to (α i (t i ), y i , 0) in order to obtain y i • α by rule (ii.a). This is a profitable deviation for each agent i ∈ N α . Therefore, f • α is not Bayesian implementable.
A quantum Bayesian mechanism
Following Ref. [5] , here we will propose a quantum Bayesian mechanism to modify the sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation. According to Eq (4) in Ref.
[10], two-parameter quantum strategies are drawn from the set:
Without loss of generality, we assume that: 
The setup of the quantum Bayesian mechanism Γ Q B = ((Σ i ) i∈N ,ĝ) is depicted in Fig.  1 . The working steps of Γ Q B are given as follows:
Step 1: Nature selects a state t ∈ T and assigns t to the agents. Each agent i knows t i and q i (t −i |t i ). The state of each quantum coin is set as |C . The initial state of the n quantum coins is |ψ 0 = |C · · · CC n .
Step 2: If f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then go to Step 4. 
Step 7.
Step 4:
) (where α is specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity). Let n quantum coins be entangled bŷ J. |ψ 1 =Ĵ|ψ 0 .
Step 5: Each agent i independently performs a local unitary operationω i on his/her own quantum coin.
Step 6: Let n quantum coins be disentangled byĴ + . |ψ 3 =Ĵ + |ψ 2 .
Step 7: The device measures the state of n quantum coins and sends card(i, 0) (or card(i, 1)) as m i to the designer if the state of quantum coin i is |C (or |D ).
Step 8: The designer receives the overall message m = (m 1 , · · · , m n ) and let the final outcomeĝ(σ) = g(m) using rules (i)-(iii) specified in the traditional Bayesian mechanism. END.
Given n ≥ 3 agents and an SCF f , suppose f satisfies multi-Bayesian monotonicity.
where α, N α , y i are specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity). We define the payoff to the n-th agent as follows: $ C···CC represents the payoff to the n-th agent when the measured state of n quantum coins in Step 7 of Γ 
Definition 2:
Given an SCF f satisfying multi-Bayesian monotonicity, define condition λ B as follows: 1) λ B 1 : Consider the payoff to the n-th agent, $ C···CC > $ D···DD , i.e., he/she prefers the expected payoff of a certain outcome (generated by rule (i)) to the expected payoff of an uncertain outcome (generated by rule (iii)). 2) λ B 2 : Consider the payoff to the n-th agent, $ C···CC > $ C···CD [ 
Proposition 2:
In economic environments, consider an SCF f that is incentive compatible and Bayesian monotonic, if f is multi-Bayesian monotonic and condition λ B is satisfied, then f •α is Bayesian implementable by using the quantum Bayesian mechanism. Proof: Since f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then there exist a deception α, f • α f , and 2 ≤ l ≤ n agents that satisfy Eq (**), i.e., for each agent i ∈ N α , there exist t i ∈ T i and an SCF y i ∈ F such that:
Hence, the quantum Bayesian mechanism will enter Step 4.
Since condition λ B is satisfied, then similar to the proof of Proposition 2 in Ref. [5] , if the n agents choosê
Step 7, the corresponding measured state of n quantum coins is |C · · · CC n . Hence, for each agent
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
An algorithmic Bayesian mechanism
Following Ref. [6] , in this section we will propose an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism to help agents benefit from the quantum Bayesian mechanism in the macro world. In the beginning, we cite matrix representations of quantum states from Ref. [6] .
Matrix representations of quantum states
In quantum mechanics, a quantum state can be described as a vector. For a twolevel system, there are two basis vectors: (1, 0) T and (0, 1) T . In the beginning, we define:
For γ = π/2,
A simulating algorithm
Similar to Ref. [6] , in the following we will propose a simulating algorithm that simulates the quantum operations and measurements in Steps 4-7 of the quantum Bayesian mechanism given in Section 4. The inputs and outputs of the algorithm are adjusted to the case of Bayesian implementation. The factor γ is also set as its maximum π/2. For n agents, the inputs and outputs of the algorithm are illustrated in Fig. 2 . The Matlab program is given in Fig. 3 , which is cited from Ref. [6] . 
Inputs:
1) θ i , φ i , i = 1, · · · , n: the parameters of agent i's local operationω i , θ i ∈ [0, π], φ i ∈ [0, π/2]. 2) card(i, 0), card(i, 1), i = 1, · · · ,
Outputs:
m i , i = 1, · · · , n: the agent i's message that is sent to the designer, m i ∈ T i × F × Z + .
Procedures of the algorithm:
Step 1: Reading parameters θ i and φ i from each agent i ∈ N (See Fig. 3(a) ).
Step 2 Step 5: Computing the probability distribution ψ 3 |ψ 3 (See Fig. 3(c) ).
Step 6: Randomly choosing a "collapsed" state from the set of all 2 n possible states {|C · · · CC n , · · · , |D · · · DD n } according to the probability distribution ψ 3 |ψ 3 .
Step 7: For each i ∈ N, the algorithm sends card(i, 0) (or card(i, 1)) as m i to the designer if the i-th basis vector of the "collapsed" state is |C (or |D ) (See Fig.  3(d) ).
An algorithmic version of the quantum Bayesian mechanism
In the quantum Bayesian mechanism Γ Q B = ((Σ i ) i∈N ,ĝ), the key parts are quantum operations and measurements, which are restricted by current experimental technologies. In Section 5.2, these parts are replaced by a simulating algorithm which can be easily run in a computer. Now we update the quantum Bayesian mechanism
A strategy profile is σ = ( σ i , σ −i ), where σ −i :
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ B is a strategy profile σ * = ( σ * 1 , · · · , σ * n ) such that for any agent i ∈ N and for all t i ∈ T i ,
Since the factor γ is set as its maximum π/2, the condition λ B in the quantum Bayesian mechanism shall be updated as λ Working steps of the algorithmic Bayesian mechanism Γ B :
Step 1: Given an SCF f , if f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, go to Step 3.
Step 2: Each agent i sends (t i , f i , z i ) as m i to the designer. Go to Step 5.
Step 3:
i are specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity). Then each agent i submits θ i , φ i , card(i, 0) and card(i, 1) to the simulating algorithm.
Step 4: The simulating algorithm runs and outputs messages m 1 , · · · , m n to the designer.
Step 5: The designer receives the overall message m = (m 1 , · · · , m n ) and let the final outcome be g(m) using rules (i)-(iii) of the traditional Bayesian mechanism. END. 2) If f is not multi-Bayesian monotonic, then Γ B is reduced to the traditional Bayesian mechanism. Since the SCF f is incentive compatible and Bayesian monotonic, then it is Bayesian implementable.
New results for Bayesian implementation

Conclusions
This paper follows the series of papers on quantum mechanisms [5, 6] , and generalizes the quantum and algorithmic mechanisms in Refs. [5, 6] to Bayesian implementation. It can be seen that for n agents, the time complexity of quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms are O(n) and O(2 n ) respectively. Although current experimental technologies restrict the quantum Bayesian mechanism to be commercially available, for small-scale cases (e.g., less than 20 agents [6] ), the algorithmic Bayesian mechanism can help agents benefit from quantum Bayesian mechanism just in the macro world. start_time = cputime
